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Should Oscar Run?
Peter Charlish* & Dr. Stephen Riley†
BACKGROUND
Oscar Pistorius is a South African sprinter who was aiming to
run at the Beijing Olympic Games in the summer of 2008, either in
the 200 meters or the 400 meters. Given his physical condition,
this may at first glance have appeared to be a ludicrous
proposition.
Pistorius was born without fibula bones and
consequently had both legs amputated below the knee before his
first birthday. He competes using a pair of prosthetic limbs
attached to his legs. These J-shaped carbon fiber blades are known
as “Cheetahs.”1 The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”)
and the International Association of Athletics Federations
(“IAAF”), after conducting a series of tests, concluded on January
14, 2008 that Pistorius was ineligible for entry into the Games.2
This Article looks at the circumstances surrounding the decision to
ban Pistorius and further examines previous precedent and
philosophical argument, which suggest that perhaps Pistorius has

A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2759. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
Peter Charlish (P.Charlish@shu.ac.uk) is the Acting Head of the Law Department
and Subject Leader for Sports Law at Sheffield Hallam University. He received his M.A.
Law and M/Phil from the University of Sheffield.
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University. He received his LL.M. in Law from the University of Nottingham and Ph.D.
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1
See Matthew Pryor, Oscar Pistorius Is Put Through His Paces to Justify His Right to
Run, TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
sport/more_sport/athletics/article2903673.ece (noting that the Icelandic engineered limbs
modelled after the shape of the foot of a cheetah).
2
Oscar Pistorius Banned From Olympics, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 14, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/athletics/article3184427.ece.
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been judged too harshly and that it may be time to re-examine the
eligibility rules for Olympic competition.
In March 2007, Pistorius finished second in the South African
national championships in the 400 meters, which qualified him for
their 4 x 400 meters relay team. Although Pistorius has still not
achieved the individual qualifying time for the 400 meters, his
achievement in the national championship, coupled with the
likelihood of the South African team qualifying as one of the 16
fastest nations in the world, meant that it was highly likely that
Pistorius would have been at the Olympic Games, at the very least
in his capacity as a member of that relay team. However in March
2007, following the emergence of Pistorius as a realistic candidate
for the South African team, the IAAF introduced an amendment to
their rules which prohibited the: “use of any technical device that
incorporates springs, wheels or any other element that provides the
user with an advantage over another athlete not using such a
device.”3 Some have suggested that this rule was introduced
specifically to deal with the threat posed by Pistorius,4 an
allegation vehemently denied by IAAF council member Robert
Hersh. Hersh stated that “[w]e did not legislate against his specific
device because we haven’t looked at his specific legs.”5 Some
critics have argued that his carbon fibre prosthetics give Pistorius
an advantage over other competitors and that allowing his
participation may signal the beginning of a very slippery slope.6
Despite the existence of the rule, Pistorius was initially at least

3

IAAF Competition Rule 144.2 (2008), available at http://www.iaaf.org/news/
newsId=42896.printer.html; see also Steve Goldberg, Do Disabled Athletes Have an
Edge?, TIME, June 8, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1631050,00.htm. Reportedly, athletes in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games will
attempt to use masks to prevent against pollution. It will be interesting to see if this rule
is applied so as to prevent distance runners from wearing these masks during competition.
4
Jere Longman, Disabled Runner Makes Case for Competing in Olympics, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?
id=5704964 (including rowers Robert Gailey, from University of Miami Medical School,
and Angela Schneider, a sports ethicist from University of Western Ontario and a 1984
Olympic silver medalist, as examples).
5
Goldberg, supra note 3.
6
See John Inverdale, Oscar Pistorius Ruling Should Be Heartless, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jtml?xml=/sport/2007/11/21/
soinve121.xml.
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temporarily given permission to compete, subject to the future
investigation (the results of which were announced on January 14,
2008) into the nature of his prosthetic limbs, which was eventually
used to extinguish his hopes of competing in the Games. Although
the decisive ruling went against Pistorius, there does remain the
possibility, remote though it may be, that the IOC could yet
overrule the IAAF, for the IOC retains the right to set their own
eligibility rules and reserves the right to intervene against the
decision of a governing body if they feel it is necessary.7
Pistorius would not have been the first disabled athlete to
compete in the Olympic Games.8 In 2000 and again in 2004 Marla
Runyon from the United States, who is legally blind due to
Stargardt’s disease,9 ran in the 1500 meters and the 5000 meters.
Two archers have also breached the divide between able-bodied
and disabled sport: wheelchair bound Paola Fantato represented
Italy at the 1996 Athens Olympics and New Zealand’s Neroli
Fairhall was only denied a place at the Moscow Games by the
International boycott, although she reached the Los Angeles
Games in 1984. As far back as 1904, at the St. Louis Games, the
American gymnast George Eyser actually won six medals,
including three gold medals, while competing with a wooden leg.10
The traffic is not one way between disabled and able-bodied sport.
With the backing of the British Wheelchair Racing Association
and Dame Tanni Grey-Thompson,11 “able-bodied” Daniel Sadler
has been competing in wheelchair events for twelve years.12 Grey7

See Longman, supra note 4.
For details of disabled sports participants who have competed with “able-bodied”
participants in the United States see Eldon L. Ham, Disabled Athletes: A Last Vestige of
Court Tolerated Discrimination?, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 741, 749 (1998).
9
Stargardt’s disease is an inherited degenerative condition, the most common form of
which begins in late childhood and leads to legal blindness. See Richard L. Windsor &
Laura K. Windsor, Understanding Stargardt’s Disease, Vision Worldwide,
http://www.visionww.org/drswindsor-stargardt.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
10
See Goldberg, supra note 3.
11
Profile of Tanni Grey-Thompson, BBC.com, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ouch/
paralympics/profiles/tanni_grey_thompson.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (Thompson
is a multiple gold-medal winning paralympic athlete).
12
Mr. Sadler began competing because of his father, who was a competitor paralyzed
from the waist down. See Tom Fordyce, Sadler’s Sit-down Protest, BBC.com, Apr. 3,
2002, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/1909192.stm.
8
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Thompson commented: “People assume Dan has an unfair
advantage. He hasn’t,” she said. “He may have stomach muscles
that work, but he’s carrying more weight, he gets leg cramps, and
he makes a less aerodynamic shape.”13
He competed in the Great North Run in 2001, although the
prize-money he won was withdrawn when the organisers realized
that he was “able-bodied.”14 His story only came to prominence
when he attempted and failed to gain admittance to the London
Marathon in 2007, despite the fact that the rules for wheelchair
athletes competing in the marathon make no mention of the
necessity for a competitor to be ordinarily confined to a
wheelchair.15 The rules refer only to the necessity for competitors
to be secured into their wheelchair during the marathon and to
propel the chair with hands and arms only.16
The interpretation attached to the rule introduced by the IAAF
in March17 played a crucial part in the decision concerning
Pistorius’ eligibility. Elio Locatelli18 explained the rule by saying:
“With all due respect, we cannot accept something that provides
advantages. . . . It affects the purity of sport. Next will be another
device where people can fly with something on their back.”19
The kind of sensationalist language used by Locatelli does the
IAAF no credit and unfortunately appears to move the debate
surrounding these particular prosthetic limbs from the legal and
scientific and into the territory more associated with tabloid
newspapers. To reiterate, the rule prohibits the: “use of any
technical device that incorporates springs, wheels or any other

13

See id.
Id.
15
Wheelchair Marathon Rules and Regulations, Disability Sport Events,
http://www.disabilitysport.org.uk/sports/dyncat.cfm?catid=1888 (last visited Feb. 11,
2008).
16
Id. Rule 3(a).
17
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18
Elio Locatelli is the director of development for the IAAF. See Jere Longman, An
Amputee Sprinter: Is He Disabled or Too-Abled?, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/sports/othersports/15runner.html.
19
Id.
14
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element that provides the user with an advantage over another
athlete not using such a device.”20
What is beyond question is that the limbs used by Pistorius are
technical devices. Further, Hugh Herr, Associate Professor at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,21 argued that they have
spring-like qualities: “The prosthetic he’s using is completely
passive—it’s just a spring.”22 The implication of this statement
may at first glance appear to have been fatal to Pistorius’ chances
to compete in the Olympics. Herr’s statement implies that on a
crude reading of IAAF rule 144.223 the prosthetic limbs appear to
violate it. However, Herr then goes on to explain the nature of a
spring and these particular limbs, suggesting that a spring will not
produce its own energy, but will merely return a percentage of
what is put in; this contrasts with the human foot which will
generate its own energy on contact with the ground. Herr explains
that the generation of force off the ground produced by the human
leg, “comes from the muscles, and [Pistorius] has no muscles,”24
which would suggest that Pistorius obtains no advantage over an
able-bodied competitor.25
In a 1987 study published in Archives of Physical
Medical Rehabilitation, researchers evaluated the
Flex-Foot, made by Ossur and similar to the
Cheetah, against a human foot. Landing on a
human foot in a running stride gave a 241% spring
efficiency, or energy return, because of the
20

Goldberg, supra note 3.
Hugh Herr is a professor of media, arts and sciences at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), and Director of the Institute’s Biomechatronics Group. He is also a
double amputee. His work on prosthetic limbs won Popular Mechanics magazine’s first
annual Breakthrough Leadership Award in 2005. See Hugh Herr Wins Popular
Mechanics’ Leadership Award, Oct. 5, 2005, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2005/herr1005.html.
22
See
Posting
of
Amber
Smith
to
Health
&
Fitness
Blog,
http://blog.syracuse.com/healthfitness/2007/08/todays_athletic_prosthetics_ar.html (Aug.
7, 2007, 0:03 EST) (posting an L.A. Times article by Jeannine Stein).
23
IAAF Competition Rule 144.2, supra note 3.
24
See Smith, supra note 22.
25
Ossur, the Icelandic manufacturer of the prosthetic limbs used by Pistorius, contends
that Pistorius gets only between 60–70% of the return that a natural lower limb produces.
See Pryor, supra note 1.
21
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contraction of the calf muscles. In comparison, the
Flex-Foot had an 82% spring efficiency.26
Robert Gailey, a professor at University of Miami Medical
School, comments further:
Are they looking at not having an unfair advantage?
Or are they discriminating because of the purity of
the Olympics, because they don’t want to see a
disabled man line up against an able-bodied man for
fear that if the person who doesn’t have the perfect
body wins, what does that say about the image of
man? . . . There is no science that he has an
advantage, only that he is competing at a
disadvantage.27
It is clear, therefore, that, in terms of the crude spring qualities,
this device certainly affords Pistorius a performance advantage
over and above anything he could achieve without such limbs.
Nonetheless, the crucial point here is that as regards the definition
of the pertinent IAAF rule, this device does not give him an
advantage “over another athlete not using such a device.”28 The
question then arises as to how his eligibility should have been
decided: should the performance advantage be measured against
that which he would be able to achieve without his prosthetic limbs
(ineligible) or should it be measured against the very athletes
against whom he would be competing (eligible)? These artificial
limbs appear to enable Pistorius to compete, albeit still at a
disadvantage, against able-bodied athletes. It may therefore be
suggested that it is perverse to deny him the right to compete and
earn his living as a professional athlete on the able-bodied circuit if
the basis of the decision is taken purely on the spring qualities of
the devices.
With the agreement of Pistorius, the IAAF conducted an
investigation into the nature of his artificial limbs, with the aim of
producing definitive guidelines concerning the use of such
prosthetic limbs. The President of IAAF, Lamine Diack, noted
26
27
28

Smith, supra note 22.
Longman, supra note 18.
IAAF Competition Rule 144.2, supra note 3.
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that the study, which was conducted in October and November of
2007, would ultimately decide whether Pistorius could use these
particular prosthetic limbs.29 The argument, as explained by
Diack, did not appear to be about the use of prosthetic limbs per
se, but rather about the use of what he termed technical aids. He
commented:
It is important to underline that the IAAF does not
have, nor contemplate, a ban on prosthetic limbs,
but rather technical aids. The aim of the rule
change is not an attempt to prevent disabled athletes
from using any artificial limbs or competing against
able-bodied athletes if they are good enough to do
so.30
Diack then went on to explain the rationale behind the IAAF
investigation:
I am a great admirer of the Paralympic movement,
and I would like to take this opportunity to
congratulate Oscar on all his achievements to date.
Yet now that Oscar has improved his times to the
extent that he is able to compete in open athletics
competitions, the IAAF has a duty to make sure that
his prosthetics are analysed carefully. We cannot
permit technical aids that give one athlete an unfair
advantage over another. Personally, I am very
pleased that Oscar has agreed to do this research31
with Professor Bruggemann,32 as the results will
have very important implications for sports
science.33
29
IAAF and Oscar Pistorius to Co-operate, International Sports Press Association,
July 26, 2007, http://www.aipsmedia.com/index.php?page=news&cod=1349&tp=n
[hereinafter Co-operate].
30
Id.
31
In addition to examining the biomechanical properties of his prosthetic limbs, the
tests (which were paid for by the IAAF at a cost of €30,000) also measured Pistorius
against six other runners of similar quality and attempted to measure the entirety of his
performance. See Pryor, supra note 1.
32
Bruggemann is one of the world’s leading independent experts in athletics
biomechanics at Cologne University’s Institute of Biomechanics in Germany.
33
Co-operate, supra note 29.
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While Diack’s rationale appears entirely reasonable, there must
be some concern about the system of measurement utilized in the
tests by the IAAF. While the measurement of the crude mechanics
of the limbs themselves should not have proved to be problematic,
what may have been more difficult were the intangible advantages
and disadvantages that Pistorius gains. How, for example, may the
fatiguing effect of lactic acid buildup in the calves of able-bodied
athletes in the final stages of a 400 meters race be measured and
the commensurate disadvantages suffered by them against
Pistorius, who would suffer no such problems?34 Conversely is it
possible to quantify the disadvantages that Pistorius has suffered
throughout his life and continues to suffer as a direct result of his
disability? Just as Pistorius suffers no fatigue in his legs below his
knees, similarly he is only able to produce propulsive effects via
muscles above his knees. The likely net effect of his particular
personal circumstances must be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to accurately quantify. However, it was crucial for
Pistorius that the entire package of benefit and detriment was taken
into consideration when assessing the impact of these artificial
limbs, rather than the investigation looking solely at the limbs in
isolation. Even if it was proven that the limbs themselves
produced a real and obvious advantage, might such an advantage
merely be viewed as redressing the overall performance balance,
and therefore may not be viewed as an advantage over other elite
athletes at his level of performance? By exploring the global
performance of Pistorius rather than merely examining the effects
of the prosthetic limbs on him in isolation, it is submitted that we
retain objectivity in assessing not just the status of Pistorius, but
also any athletes who may be in his position in the future. To
properly assess possible performance advantage, one should also
examine the overall detriment that personal circumstances may
cause a participant. Equity demands that it is the net status of
performance, rather than the isolated effects of the prosthetic
limbs, that drives eligibility in the circumstances in which Pistorius
found himself. The IAAF appears to have attempted an equitable
34

The IAAF instigated the tests after they contested that they had evidence that he was
the only 400 metres runner in history to run the second half of the race faster than the first
half. See Pryor, supra note 1.
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testing regime by measuring the performance of Pistorius against
six other athletes of similar ability. The BBC reported that:
“Pistorius ran alongside six able-bodied athletes who have similar
400 [meter] personal bests to him, in order to establish whether his
blades counted as ‘technical aids,’ which are forbidden in
competition.”35
In their attempts to ensure that the testing procedure was fair,
the IAAF may have unwittingly put in place a testing regime that
was flawed and potentially biased against Pistorius. Quite clearly,
by measuring him against six other athletes capable of achieving
similar times, the IAAF attempted to compare like with like.
However, the position of Oscar Pistorius is unlike any other
athlete. While he may currently be running times around 46
seconds, he has only been running seriously for just over three
years.36 It may well be the case that a more accurate measure
would be to assess him against athletes who have run considerably
faster, rather than against those who are close to their peak at the
times Pistorius is currently capable of running. Pistorius’ potential
may be far greater than those against whom he is being measured.
The physiology of the performance of an elite athlete at the very
peak of their performance may be significantly different to the
physiology of a good athlete (those against whom Pistorius is
currently being measured) at the peak of their particular
performance. The question must be asked: into which category
should Pistorius fall? The IAAF has clearly placed him in the
latter category, when it may have been more appropriate to
measure him against the very elite, against whom he aspires to
race. The IAAF appeared to conclude following the tests that
Pistorius’ performance was quantitatively different to those
currently running his times. Therefore, it would seem that they
concluded that his prosthetics gave him an unfair advantage, which
left them no choice but to ban him from competing. It is at least
35

Sam Lyon, Pistorius Waits on IAAF All-Clear, BBC SPORT, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/athletics/6917645.stm.
36
He took up running seriously following an injury received playing rugby. Track
work formed part of his rehabilitation program. Phil Stewart, “Fastest Man on No Legs”
Put to Rome Test, REUTERS, July 12, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/
idUSL1282940920070712.
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debatable that this is a flawed approach and that the true test of his
abilities should be measured against elite athletes, rather than
merely good ones.
Immediately prior to the release of the ruling denying Pistorius
the right to compete in the Olympics, news unfortunately leaked
out making it clear that the IAAF would deny him entry into the
Games. Writing in The UK Times, Pryor cited a conversation
between Professor Brugemann37 and Die Welt:38
He [Pistorius] has a considerable advantage
compared with athletes without prosthetic limbs
who have undergone the same tests. . . . The
difference is several percentage points and I did not
think the findings would be so clear. . . . [H]is
aerobic performance was worse, his anaerobic
performance was the same. He could be in better
shape. The fact that he still runs the same times as
the other runners is due to his prosthetics. The
prosthetics return 90 per cent [sic] of the impact
energy, compared to the 60 per cent [sic] of the
human foot.39
While it is regrettable that this news appeared to have leaked
out in this manner, it is clear that the apparent data attained on the
prosthetic limbs is broadly consistent with data cited earlier.40
However, the data gleaned concerning the biomechanical
properties of the human foot appears to differ widely from that
cited earlier.41 The differentiation is so great that concern must be
raised as to how accurate it can ever be to assess performance
benefit and detriment in this manner.

37

Brugemann is the scientist leading the team responsible for testing Pistorius. Id.
A German daily newspaper established in 1946. See Die Welt, Britannica Online
Encyclopedia, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9076527/Die-Welt (last visited Feb.
11, 2008).
39
Pryor, supra note 1.
40
See, Longman, supra note 18 (noting that a prosthetic similar to that used by
Pistorius had an 80% efficiency rating, compared to the 90% reported here).
41
Compare this figure of 80% to the study reported supra note 18 where the human
foot was reported to be capable of generating its own energy return to the tune of 241%
of that put in. See id.
38
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Pistorius’ feats in attaining this level of performance may be a
precursor of things to come for the IAAF and other sports
governing bodies. Goldberg has noted the impact of the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq on the number of young Americans returning
from these conflicts with disabling injuries. They comment:
And while Pistorius could become the first amputee
to qualify for an Olympic track event, he probably
won’t be the last to give it a try. With more and
more soldiers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq
with disabling injuries and high-tech fixes, the
population of disabled American athletes is growing
at a faster rate than anytime since the Vietnam
war.42
It therefore seems certain that there are likely to be further
challenges to the sporting establishment from disabled athletes
wishing to compete against able-bodied participants; we also may
see legal challenges to the decisions of sports governing bodies.
With the tests conducted on Pistorius costing in the range of
€30,000, such challenges may place a high financial burden on
sports governing bodies. Conversely, if it is left to the individual
athlete to fund such tests, the high costs involved may prove to be
prohibitively expensive, meaning few, if any, challenges will get
off the ground. In the leading American case on the rights of
disabled sports participants,43 the subject of cost and resources was
an issue raised as being significant by the dissenting opinion,44
examined below.
RELEVANT CASE LAW
Disabled American professional golfer Casey Martin fought all
the way to the Supreme Court for the right to use a golf cart when
competing on the United States professional tour. Martin suffers
from a degenerative circulatory disorder, Klippel-TrenaunayWeber Syndrome, a progressive disease that obstructs the flow of
42
43
44

Goldberg, supra note 3.
See generally PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (Martin III), 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
Id. at 696–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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blood from his right leg to his heart.45 The consequence of this is
severe pain, anxiety and an inability to walk 18 holes.46 The
Supreme Court was first required to answer whether the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) applied to entry to professional golf
tournaments by a qualified disabled individual. In answering
affirmatively, the Court ruled that under Title III of the ADA the
Professional Golfers’ Association (“PGA”) Tour was prohibited
from denying Martin equal access to its tour.47 Title III of the
ADA states: “[N]o individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”48
Once the first question was answered positively, the Court then
focused on three questions pertaining to the request modification:
(1) whether the requested modification was a reasonable one, (2)
whether it was necessary to help the disabled individual, and (3)
whether it would fundamentally alter the nature of the
competition.49 In describing the Ninth Circuit’s finding that
Martin affirmatively answered the first two questions, the Court
stated that “permitting Martin to use a golf cart was both a
‘reasonable and a necessary solution to the problem of providing
him access to the tournaments.’”50
Without the provision of a cart, Martin would be denied equal
access to the PGA tour. The provision of a cart, as the Supreme
Court acknowledged,51 was not something that would merely make
Martin’s experience more comfortable. It was of fundamental
45

Id. at 668.
Id. A professional golf tournament comprises four eighteen-hole rounds, played over
four days. Typically courses are 6500–7500 yards in length and the average professional
will walk an estimate of at least 4 miles each round. See PGA Tour
Schedule,PGATour.com, http://www.pgatour.com/r/schedule (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
47
Martin III, 532 U.S. at 677.
48
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2008).
49
Martin III, 532 U.S. at 682–83.
50
Id. at 673 (quoting Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 204 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
51
Id. at 682.
46
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importance, as without it he simply could not fulfill the
requirement of walking the golf course. It was therefore both a
reasonable and a necessary provision.52
The key issue that the Court therefore needed to address was
whether allowing Martin to use a cart would “fundamentally alter”
the nature of the event.53 Investigating this question, the Court
found that there were actually three different sets of rules
governing the playing of golf in the United States.54 The pertinent
rule was covered in the “Conditions of Competition and Local
Rules,” sometimes referred to as the “hard card.”55 The Court
stated that the “hard card” required professional golfers “to walk
the golf course during tournaments, but not during open qualifying
rounds.”56 Martin had been permitted to use a cart while attending
Stanford University and in the PGA Tour’s Qualifying school.57
However, at the third stage, the PGA Tour enforced a strict
interpretation of the “hard card” rules and refused to allow Martin
to use a cart.58 The PGA Tour further refused to review medical
records submitted by Martin in support of his application,59
therefore arguably failing to take Martin’s individual
circumstances into account, as required by the ADA.60 In
assessing the nature of golf, the PGA Tour “asserted that the
condition of walking is a substantive rule of competition, and that
waiving it as to any individual for any reason would fundamentally
alter the nature of the competition.”61
Expert testimony provided by individuals, such as Jack
Nicklaus, Arnold Palmer, and Ken Venturi, explained the
importance of the nature of the fatigue in golf engendered in part
by walking the course, and further that such fatigue was
particularly important on the last day of a tournament when
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See id.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 667 (citation omitted).
Id. n.4.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 670.
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physical and psychological pressure was at its height.62 However,
while suggesting that the use of a cart may give an individual an
advantage over other participants, the expert testimony gave no
opinion on any potential advantage that Martin specifically may or
may not gain from such use.63 In finding for Martin, the Court
assessed the nature of any advantage gained by him in comparison
to other competitors, rather than simply assessing the performance
benefit accruing from the use of the cart in absolute terms. In fact,
the district court judge found that:
[P]laintiff is in significant pain when he walks, and
even when he is getting in and out of the cart. With
each step, he is at risk of fracturing his tibia and
hemorrhaging. The other golfers have to endure the
psychological stress of competition as part of their
fatigue; Martin has the same stress plus the added
stress of pain and risk of serious injury. . . . To
perceive that the cart puts him—with his
condition—at a competitive advantage is a gross
distortion of reality.64
It was acknowledged that his use of a cart was a modification
of the nature of the event. However, the Supreme Court held that
such a modification would not “fundamentally alter” the nature of
the event and that it was reasonable and necessary modification.65
Therefore, the Court held that the use of a cart was justified under
the three ADA requirements.66
Casey Martin is not the only golfer in the United States in
recent years to resort to the courts in an attempt to be granted
permission to use a golf cart in a PGA event.67 Although not
suffering from the same disorder as Martin,68 Ford Olinger’s
disability caused similar problems and his case, like Martin’s,
62

Id. at 671.
Id.
64
Id. at 670 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (D.
Or. 1998)).
65
Id. at 690.
66
Id.
67
See generally Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n (Olinger I), 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
68
Olinger suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, a degenerative condition that
significantly impairs his ability to walk. Id. at 1001.
63
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hinged on his request to use a golf cart in the U.S. Open Golf
Championship. However, in finding against Olinger,69 the Court
held that to allow him to use the cart would “fundamentally alter
the nature of the competition.”70 Essentially, the Court opined that
there were two distinct reasons to deny Olinger use of a cart. The
first was an argument that had been dismissed in Martin:71 that the
fatigue engendered by walking was a critical part of golf and the
use of a cart would impact upon this, thus fundamentally altering
the nature of the challenge faced by Olinger.72 Partially quoting
the district court, the Seventh Circuit held:
The point of an athletic competition . . . is to decide
who, under conditions that are about the same for
everyone, can perform an assigned set of tasks
better than (not as well as) any other competitor.
The set of tasks assigned to the competitor in the
U.S. Open includes not merely striking a golf ball
with precision, but doing so under greater than
usual mental and physical stress.
The
accommodation Mr. Olinger seeks, while
reasonable in a general sense, would alter the
fundamental nature of that competition. . . . physical
endurance and stamina and uniform rules are
critical factors in determining the winner of a
championship-level golf competition. Dr. Theodore
Holland also testified that physical endurance and
stamina are important criteria in determining the
national golf champion. As he put it, “[t]here is a
lot more to getting . . . around those 72 holes than
just hitting the shots.”73
While acknowledging the importance of fatigue under some
circumstances, the suspicion remains that the court took no account
69
Petition for a writ of certiorari was granted and the case was remanded to the Seventh
Circuit for further review in light of the Martin decision. See Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n
(Olinger II), 532 U.S. 1064, 1064 (2001).
70
Olinger I, 205 F.3d at 1006.
71
Martin III, 532 U.S. at 667–78.
72
Olinger I, 205 F.3d at 1006–07.
73
Id. at 1006 (citation omitted).
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of the additional strains faced by Olinger due to his disability and
merely measured the benefit accrued from cart usage against an
able-bodied competitor, rather than measuring the advantage
Olinger may obtain relative to the position he held due to his
disability. This is an issue of fundamental importance when
assessing whether or not an athlete may gain an advantage through
the use of an artificial aid. The performance advantage obtained
from the aid in isolation should not be the criterion upon which
eligibility is measured. Arguably, the only appropriate approach is
to weigh the individual circumstances in every situation. While
such individual inquiry may prove a difficult standard for a
governing body to meet and certainly may have resource
implications, perhaps encouraging further litigation,74 it is
submitted that it is the most appropriate approach. Indeed, when
considering the position of Casey Martin, it was specifically noted
that the United States Golf Association (“USGA”) paid no heed to
his individual circumstances. The Court stressed that such refusal
was specifically against the purpose of the ADA:
Refusal of non-profit professional golf association
to consider disabled golfer’s personal circumstances
in deciding whether to accommodate his disability
ran counter to the clear language and purpose of the
ADA, despite the association’s claim that all the
substantive
rules
for
its
“highest-level”
competitions were sacrosanct and could not be
modified under any circumstances.75
Under the text of the ADA, there exists an obligation, as
acknowledged in Martin III,76 to take into account the individual
circumstances of the claimant golfer in assessing the provision of a

74

42 U.S.C. § 101(10) (1990) specifically addresses undue hardship, which may be
forced upon an organization in complying with the act, citing such issues as expense and
resource implications for an organization in seeking to accommodate a disabled
individual. It was noted earlier, for example, that the tests undertaken by Oscar Pistorius
cost about €30,000. Martin III, 532 U.S. at 683 (Scalia J., dissenting). This raised
concerns about the likelihood of encouraging further litigation if Martin was allowed to
use a cart.
75
Martin III, 532 U.S. at 689.
76
Id. at 690.
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cart.77 This principle quite clearly goes hand-in-hand with the
notion of a reasonable accommodation from the perspective of the
competitor. In looking at what may amount to a reasonable
accommodation, the nature of such inquiry is compelled to be an
individual one. Only by investigating the nature of the individual’s
disability and the nature of the accommodation needed for them to
be granted equal access to their chosen activity can the
reasonableness of that proposed accommodation be assessed. The
act rightly focuses on the individual’s dealing with discrimination
and barriers to equality.78 Such an inquiry will have important
implications for any individual attempting to rely on such a
provision and will also have far-reaching resource implications for
any governing body.
The second reason offered for refusing Olinger’s request to use
a cart was that the modification, the permission to use a cart, was
not a reasonable one.79 The issue was whether the USGA would
have to undergo undue hardship in granting the use of a cart.80 In
assessing undue hardship, the ADA states:
The term “undue hardship” means an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of the factors set forth in [this
chapter]. . . .
In
determining
whether
an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on a covered entity, factors to be considered include
the nature and cost of the accommodation needed
under this chapter; the overall financial resources of
the facility or facilities involved in the provision of
the reasonable accommodation; the number of
persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of
such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility; the overall financial resources of the
covered entity; the overall size of the business of a
covered entity with respect to the number of its
77
78
79
80

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12101.
Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n (Olinger I), 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
42 U.S.C. § 102(b)(5)(A).
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employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities.81
In assessing the position of the USGA in relation to the ADA,
the court, again citing agreement with the district court, noting:
the administrative burdens of evaluating requests to
waive the walking rule and permit the use of a golf
cart. As the [district] court explained, the USGA
“would need to develop a system and a fund of
expertise82 to determine whether a given applicant
truly needs, or merely wants, or could use but does
not need, to ride a cart to compete.” The district
court thought that this should be unnecessary. We
agree.83
This seems a remarkable reason to cite given the vast wealth of
the USGA and the likely infrequency of requests to use a cart.
Indeed the Seventh Circuit stated that the USGA had received only
a dozen requests from eleven different people to use a cart in
fourteen years.84
The relevant legislation in England and Wales is similar in
many ways to the provisions in existence in the United States.
Under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995,85 just as in the
United States under the ADA 1990,86 a duty exists to make
reasonable adjustments in order to accommodate the disabled
individual to whom the relevant act may apply. While there have
been no cases involving professional sports participants attempting
to gain access to facilities or employment opportunities, the lead
case in England and Wales87 appears to suggest that the duty to
make reasonable accommodation may actually extend to positive
81

Id. § 101(10)(A)–(B).
Pryor, supra note 1. The tests undertaken by Oscar Pistorius have cost around
€30,000. As technology advances it is not difficult to imagine such tests increasing in
complexity and therefore cost. Similarly if Pistorius is successful in his quest, then others
are likely to follow. This will push the boundaries further and add to the financial and
administrative burden that international sports governing bodies will face.
83
Olinger I, 205 F.3d at 1007.
84
Id. at 1003.
85
Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, c. 6. (Eng.).
86
42 U.S.C § 12182 (1990).
87
See generally Archibald v. Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32 (U.K.).
82
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discrimination discriminating in favor of the disabled person to
effectively “level the playing field.”88
Mrs. Archibald was employed as a road-sweeper. Following
minor surgery she was unable to carry out her normal duties. Her
employers, the Fife Council in Scotland, subsequently made
commendable efforts to find her alternative work, including
retraining,89 and wherever possible, short-listing her as a matter of
course for jobs that she was qualified to perform. In the next few
months, Mrs. Archibald applied unsuccessfully for over 100 jobs
with the council.90 She was eventually dismissed on the grounds
of incapacity almost two years after her original surgery. In
hearing her appeal, the court held that reasonable accommodations
may extend to offering the opportunity for a disabled worker to be
re-employed at a higher grade without having to go through a
competitive interview, despite the Fife Council’s policy that
anyone being re-employed at a higher grade had to go through a
competitive interview process.91 Effectively, the House of Lords
held that such positive discrimination might be necessary to
eliminate the disadvantage that may be suffered as a result of the
disability.92
The possibility of discriminating positively in favor of the
disabled person would have important consequences for Oscar
Pistorius. If the tests carried out on Pistorius are conclusive that
the prosthetic limbs do indeed go further than merely redressing
the balance of performance, then Archibald93 and Meikle94 would
appear to suggest that under disability discrimination law this
alone should not prove fatal to Pistorius’ chances of competing in
the Olympics.
88

Id. at ¶ 57.
Id. at ¶ 53.
90
Id.
91
Id. at ¶ 54.
92
The Court of Appeal in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Meikle extended the
notion of reasonable accommodation to the provision of sick pay. 2004 WL 1372520, at ¶
57 (U.K.). The Court held that a reasonable accommodation might involve treating the
disabled employee more favorably than an able-bodied employee in assessing eligibility
for contractual sick pay. Id. at ¶ 54.
93
See generally Archibald, [2004] UKHL 32.
94
See generally Meikle, 2004 WL 1372520.
89
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Ultimately however, the key issue for Pistorius would appear to
be one based on pure scientific analysis—do his “blades” give him
an advantage over and above other comparable competitors. The
IAAF ruled that they did and thus prevented him from running in
the Olympic Games. However, it may be suggested that science is
not the most not the most important consideration; it is to these
other issues that this article now turns.
ANALYSIS
In order to unpack some of the conceptual and jurisprudential
questions generated by Pistorius’ situation, we should return to the
US Supreme Court’s discussion of the Americans with Disabilities
Act in Martin.95 The three questions the Court faced with respect
to Title III of the Act—whether a modification is reasonable,
necessary, and such that it would alter the nature of a
competition—merit further consideration.
However, a
terminological divergence from the Supreme Court’s approach is
necessary. The questions can be productively translated into
alternative analytical categories: commensurability, classification,
and sporting ideals. The first, commensurability, refers to whether
we are justified in making a comparison between different
competitors facing different challenges. The second, classification,
refers to how we classify competitors on the basis of those
different challenges. The third, sporting ideals, refers to the
fundamental assumptions underpinning both comparison and
classification in the context of sports.
A. Commensurability
Commensurability concerns what can and cannot be compared.
If, and only if, two things are capable of being compared,
commensurable, can a comparison be legitimate.96 The foregoing
legal debate concerning Pistorius generated at least two axes of
comparison: The physical and psychological challenges faced by
95

See supra note 43–66 and accompanying text.
This simple, but crucial point by Aristotle underpins the notion of equity and
equality. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, V.3. § 1131a10-b15 (Roger Crisp trans.
2000).
96
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competitors. Our first question is: Are these commensurable
challenges in themselves? And, secondly, are the challenges faced
by one competitor commensurable with the challenges faced by
another? In response to the first question: The physical and the
psychological are very different challenges and should not be
compared directly. Although all sporting competitors face both
mental and physical challenges, these are of a very different order
to one another. While the physical challenges faced by Pistorius
are very much of the essence here, he, undoubtedly, like any
competitor, faces psychological challenges in the form of focus,
preparedness, and the psychological “challenge” generated by the
presence and competitive spirit of his competitors. And further,
Pistorius’ psychological challenges are commensurable to those of
his competitors: He may face additional psychological challenges
grounded in his physical attributes, but those challenges may well
be mirrored in psychological challenges faced by his competitors.97
But one should note that these are challenges of an entirely
different order to physical challenges. Thus, because they are
therefore incommensurable, the mental and physical cannot
compensate for one another. When we come to classify the fitness,
readiness, skill, or strength of sportspersons we do not allow the
physical injury of one to be compensated by the mental make-up or
psychological challenges of another. If we were to attempt to
compensate for differing levels of psychological preparedness we
would begin to undermine fundamental principles, including
performance, at work in any sport.
The question of physical fatigue is clearly more complex.
While his competitors share similar forms of physiological fatigue,
“similarity” being assumed on the basis of their all being elite
athletes trained in the same event, Pistorius’ physiological fatigue
is different. His fatigue is different but is it nonetheless
commensurable? For his fatigue to be incommensurable it would
demand not a quantitatively different but a qualitatively different
degree of fatigue in comparison to his competitors. An example
would be if the fatigue was so negligible, manageable, or
97
Cf. Lise Gauvin & John C. Spence, Psychological Research on Exercise and Fitness:
Current Research Trends and Future Challenges, in THE SPORT PSYCHOLOGIST 9, 434–48
(1995) (discussing the meta-research undertaken).
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surmountable as to fail to count as fatigue at all. One should note
that this is a descriptive question: Would we describe two different
kinds of pain in two different people as sufficiently similar? Given
the unique nature of pain, this is a difficult question to answer. If
we describe pain behaviors, then it is simpler to ask: Does
Pistorius displays the outward signs of fatigue? Again, this is a
descriptive, empirical question. In the absence of scientific advice
to the contrary98 we should assume that it is not qualitatively
different fatigue; thus, it should not be commensurable. A
definitive scientific finding that Pistorius experienced no fatigue at
all in any meaningful sense would demand a particular
classification of Pistorius as a competitor: A competitor who
should not be compared to those who do experience fatigue. If on
the other hand it remains clear in scientific terms that Pistorius
does experience fatigue in some way then we are not permitted to
dismiss Pistorius’ claim a priori.
B. Classification
If Oscar Pistorius and his physiological make-up are, at the
very least, commensurable with those of other competitors who
similarly experience fatigue, then we have to ask further questions
of how we should classify him.99
The first question of
classification is: What kind of competitor is he? He is, by
definition, a sportsman, but should he be classed as an elite
sportsman? Secondly, there is the question of classification in
terms of disability, a social designation or status, versus handicap,
a competitive designation or status.
These particular
classifications—and the gradations within them—are central not
only to sound moral and legal decision-making, but are also at the
center of discussion of sport. In fact, the questions of sportingclassification and disability-classification overlap.
Both are
essential for fair competition, because the classifications determine
what ability can be realized by individuals and further determines
98

Even leaked information on scientific study of Pistorius’ performance concedes he
experiences some comparable challenges. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
99
For a key discussion of the relevance of this, see Leslie Pickering Francis,
Competitive Sports, Disability, and Problems of Justice in Sports, in JOURNAL OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SPORTS 127–32 (2005).
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who is compared to whom. Thus, classifications draw the
boundaries between achievement and non-achievement.100
Classifying an athlete as “disabled” generates significant
problems, but these problems are germane. In short, being
classified as disabled, like any other classification, involves
internal and external comparison. Internal classification is within
existing, established boundaries, such as the conventions and
standards of a group, sport, or movement. In this sense, although
Pistorius may be perceived as disabled, the very fact that he runs
means that the designation disabled is problematic. External
classification allows classification on bases external to those
established boundaries. One such example is whether we should
gauge his situation not in terms of social disability but rather in
terms of relative handicaps within certain activities?101 In this
sense, the “handicap” potentially lies with the other competitors
and not with Pistorius. This division of external and internal
classifications is easiest to discern if we consider whether Pistorius
is a “disabled runner.” The question of whether Pistorius should be
classified as “a disabled runner” is a classification that can be
made on two grounds, depending upon whether we take the
“disabled” component or the “runner component” as primary. If
disabled is the primary component, then an internal classification
is based on whatever is stipulated as “the set of all disabled
people.” On the other hand, the external classification would be all
of the standards external to that set, including the question of
whether “disabled” is meaningful at all or whether it presumes a
standard of ability so inhumanly broad as to be meaningless. If
runner is the primary component, then classification is determined
by whatever professional standards runners adhere to; in effect
deferring questions of classification to professional sporting
bodies. This becomes less a question of Pistorius-as-disabled and
more a question of whether there is a handicap in place. External
to that are any other possible comparisons, including whether it is
possible to define “runner” at all, given that any definition
100

See generally Gudrun Doll-Tepper, Disability Sport, in THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS OF SPORT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Jim Riordan & Arnd Kruger eds.,
London 1999).
101
See Francis, supra note 99, at 130.
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stipulated by a professional body is likely to arbitrarily exclude
otherwise legitimate forms of running, such as someone running
for a bus. In sum, even if classification is possible within a
recognized standard, it is always possible to make comparisons
outside the set of standards deployed by that body. Consequently,
the question of what is ‘necessary,’ in the idiom of the Supreme
Court, to include or exclude from a classification is always—to a
greater or lesser extent—a partly arbitrary classification. This is
because there is also something external to that classification that
can be appealed to in order to challenge the classification.
Classification is, therefore, something determined in many
contexts by “insiders” who, with experience in the field or activity,
are able to perceive classification boundaries purely on the basis of
their insider experience. Those classifications are not purely
arbitrary, however: They will include, in the context of sporting
endeavour, the input of crucial sporting ideals.
C. Sporting Ideals
Three dimensions of sporting ideals are important:
achievement, fair play, and excellence. We will consider these
consecutively. First, achievement should be distinguished from
excellence. Achievement is relative to any chosen standard;
excellence, on the other hand, appeals to an objective standard of
human excellence. Achievement is linked to performance, albeit
performance in a double sense.
On the one hand, the
“maximization of one’s performance” is a dimension of
achievement (though not its sufficient condition). However,
achievement can be relative to others, to oneself, or to any other
gauge. “Performance” also connotes that sport is performed in
front of spectators. Certainly no one could dispute Pistorius’
achievement in terms of pure performance, in terms of both
maximizing an impressive performance of speed and thereby
providing a “performance” for spectators that is incomparable.
Moreover, his achievement in the wider possible sense is
impressive by any standard: in relation to his own background, to
others born with his condition, to other runners who are nonprofessional runners, and to other runners who are professional
runners. In terms of achievement alone, Pistorius’ running is
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completely comparable to that of any other sportsperson, albeit on
the basis that we are free to define achievement however we wish.
“Fair play” is more problematic insofar as it begs fundamental
questions about nuanced, often implicit, expectations and
standards.102 In other words, not only is fair play a negative
injunction to adhere to the letter and spirit of the rules and avoid
deceptive or perfidious means of achieving advantage, but also,
positively, a question of infusing one’s whole approach with high
standards of equity and fairness centered not only on achievement
but acknowledging the talents and achievement of others.103 In
this sense there is no unequivocal response to Pistorius’ wish to
run, not in terms of his own sporting ethos (which is presumably
impeccable), but in terms of the perceptions of fellow competitors
and indeed of spectators. Would they see Pistorius’ presence as a
reflection of fair play? The answer must be both yes and no. In
terms of raw perception, his presence, despite any classificatory or
comparative justification, may simply look like an affront to the
principles by which sports undertaken. It simply cannot be said
that his whole approach is infused with equity and fairness because
he appears to have an advantage. We cannot ignore this extrinsic
dimension of the experience of sport; the idea that the perceptions
of spectators viewing a performance play an important role in
conceptualizing both sport as a whole and fair play more
specifically. At the same time, sport and fair play are not reducible
to the perception of spectators: Fair play in the first instance is
something determined by experienced insiders who know and
ultimately dictate the legitimate boundaries of a sport. To make
the same point in abstract terms, all boundaries are porous
boundaries.
The “inside” and “outside” of sport are not
impermeable; the standards of fair play go beyond sport in the
same way that law and ethics generally have to inform sport. In
sum, fair play is not something that can be definitely stated and
monopolized by sport or sports, rather it evolves as all mores
102

For a critical discussion of the “bag-of-virtues” account of fair play, see Robert
Butcher & Angela Schneider, Fair Play as Respect for the Game, 25 J. OF THE PHIL. OF
SPORT 1–22 (1998).
103
See Sigmund Loland & Mike McNamee, Fair Play and the Ethos of Sports: An
Eclectic Philosophical Framework, 27 J. OF THE PHIL. OF SPORT 63–80 (2000).
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evolve. Consequently, whether or not we (and sport spectators)
perceive Pistorius’ presence as manifesting or lacking “fair play” is
something that cannot be definitively stated. Rather, it can and
will change.
As a final point on fundamental sporting principles, compare
the foregoing discussion of fundamental sporting principles with
the terms within which Pistorius’ position has been conceptualised:
purity. The “purity” of a sport looks like a prima facie intelligible
claim concerning preservation of certain sporting standards that
allow that particular sport to be undertaken in an equitable, and
indeed, satisfying way. In fact the notion of purity seems to add
little to the principles of fair play and achievement, but has the
rather more unpalatable connotation of maintaining a certain class
of people (“able-bodied” people) as carrying the “essence” of the
sport while others (“non-able bodied” people) can only undertake a
variation on the “real” form of the sport. This is not to say that
sporting bodies should not apply standards or, absurdly, that they
should avoid discrimination on all grounds including sporting
ability. Rather, purity is far less meaningful than sports’
relationship with excellence. Translated into more robust terms,
sport, particularly elite sport, aims to foster and manifest
excellence, by manifesting a standard that “cannot be humanly
surpassed.” This is not without substantial problems in itself.
Being “humanly” is a reification, a treating as real and concrete
something that is only abstract. There is no unchanging standard
of “human” or “humanly” other than what we abstract from human
activity in the past, present, or future. Sporting excellence is
similarly a way of stating in abstract terms that the highest
standards within a particular form of activity has and will change
over time. To parallel, in standard philosophical discussions of
“human excellence” (stemming, like discussion of equality,
principally from Aristotle104), this “excellence” is actually a quite
modest set of virtues whereby humans should strive to be the best
they can be given the inheritance they receive from life and
nature.105 Is there a better description of Pistorius’ bid for
Olympic glory? A manifestation of striving to draw the best he
104
105

ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at VII, 1.
Id. at II, 6.
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can from his natural inheritance, an inheritance that other, less-able
individuals would not have been able to profit from.
Consequently, if we rely in the final analysis on fundamental
sporting principles, and if sporting excellence is to mean anything,
Pistorius is an exemplar of excellence. The classificatory question
of whether he should be striving for excellence within this class of
elite competitors is a question that simply cannot—legally,
morally, or indeed logically—be satisfactorily resolved. We
should attend, rather, to his clear, and all-too-human, manifestation
of excellence. And although it can be overstated, this, in turn, may
well contribute to wider ethical discourse and ethical evolution
within and without sport. This point is made forcefully by Loland
and McManee: “If practiced according to our norm of fair play, we
believe that sporting games can stand out as a paradigmatic
practice of the possibility of moral dialogue that is so important in
our modern, pluralistic societies.”106
In other words, all of the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court—reasonable, necessary, and in keeping with sporting
ideals—are principles which will evolve. There is potential for
them to evolve in a positive way that begins to erode the division
between ability and disability. Ultimately, this erosion of division
is not simply gesture politics but “a paradigmatic practice of the
possibility of moral dialogue” potentially conducted in the most
public of arenas, the Olympic Games.
CONCLUSION: PURITY VERSUS EXCELLENCE
This Article has sought to demonstrate that Oscar Pistorius’
participation in the Olympic Games is consistent with the
jurisprudence of both the United States Supreme Court and case
law from England and Wales. That jurisprudence may be
inconsistent, but it offers sufficient grounds for opposing a
superficial exclusion of Pistorius. Exclusions are never more
superficial then when they invoke the “purity” of a sporting
endeavour. This claim merely serves to obscure clearer debates
concerning equity, comparability, and sporting ideals. Those
106

See Loland & McNamee, supra note 103, at 76.
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debates suggest that Pistorius’ participation is both consistent with
basic principles at work in sporting justice but also that Pistorius’
participation serves an important symbolic function in its
demonstration of the importance of excellence.
Pistorius’ running is surely symbolic. It is symbolic of the
increasing importance of the cybernetic integration of humans and
technology; it is also symbolic of the triumph of human
determination and spirit. The participation of Pistorius at the
Olympic Games would be of crucial symbolic importance given
the Olympic ideal:
The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute
to building a peaceful and better world by educating
youth
through
sport
practised
without
discrimination of any kind.
Discrimination,
therefore, [is] not acceptable in either spirit or in
practice on the basis of disability. Discrimination
on the basis of disability [is] no different and [is] as
objectionable as discrimination on the basis of race,
colour, sex, religion or politics.107
However, the question of whether Pistorius’ participation at the
Games would be anything more than symbolic, whether he has a
right to participate, is the crux of the matter. That right is
conferred on those who are classified as facing commensurable
challenges in pursuing human excellence, and who excel in
challenging circumstances. Any elite sporting activity is a meeting
of equals to identify the first and best amongst those equals.
Accordingly, Pistorius’ participation in a shared pursuit of
excellence is absolutely in keeping with the ethos of elite sport. It
appears to have been determined that Pistorius’ prostheses offer
him an advantage that is qualitatively different from those
advantages that can be gained by other competitors. However, this
in itself may be highly questionable. It may be decided by
Pistorius himself—as an elite athlete committed to sporting
ethics—cannot participate in sport. However, until that point, the
inclusion of Pistorius would have served to maintain both an ideal
of excellence and a distinctive contribution to Olympic ideals.
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Doll-Tepper, supra note 100, at 182 (quoting Dr. Robert Steadward).
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Pistorius should run for both of these reasons, and, most
importantly, because he has every right to run.

